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INTRODUCTION 
As the world becomes a more and more contentious place, 
people need outlets to get away from reality. In 2012, 61 percent of 
Americans turned to sports as their outlet.1 While the National 
Football League (NFL) is king in America, with over $13 billion of 
revenue from 2016-2017,2 the public’s fascination and obsession with 
sports is not limited to the United States. The international community 
has an even greater appetite for the world’s most popular sport, soccer; 
3.2 billion people tuned into the 2014 FIFA World Cup, including 1 
billion watching Germany defeat Argentina in the final.3 
As sports become more and more popular, the business behind 
it continues to grow. In 2016, the average NFL franchise value climbed 
to $2.34 billion,4 with the Los Angeles Rams’ value doubling to $2.9 
billion after their relocation from St. Louis.5 NFL teams are not the 
only franchises flush with cash, though. Following a television contract 
extension with ESPN and TNT,6 the NBA brought in $5.289 billion 
in basketball related income in 2016.7 The sports industry is a business, 
and just like any other business the key to staying in business is to 
                                                 
 1 Allen Hershkowitz, The Greening of Professional Sports, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/18/opinion/the-greening-of-
professional-sports.html. 
 2 Jason Belzer, Thanks To Roger Goodell, NFL Revenues Projected to Surpass $13 
Billion In 2016, FORBES (Feb. 29, 2016, 11:00 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbelzer/2016/02/29/thanks-to-roger-goodell-
nfl-revenues-projected-to-surpass-13-billion-in-2016/#5ef0a341cb79. 
 3 2014 FIFA World Cup™ reached 3.2 billion viewers, one billion watched final, 
FIFA (Dec. 16, 2015), 
http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/news/y=2015/m=12/news=2014-fifa-world-
cuptm-reached-3-2-billion-viewers-one-billion-watched--2745519.html. 
 4 Mike Ozanian, The NFL’s Most Valuable Teams 2016, FORBES (Sept. 14, 
2016, 9:45 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikeozanian/2016/09/14/the-
nfls-most-valuable-teams-2016/#2f6ba4b23068. 
 5 Id. 
 6 NBA extends television deals, ESPN (Feb. 14, 2016), 
http://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/11652297/nba-extends-television-deals-
espn-tnt. 
 7 Dan Feldman, Report: NBA revenue projected to reach $8 billion next season, NBC 
SPORTS (Sept. 16, 2016, 10:05 AM), http://nba.nbcsports.com/2016/09/16/report-
nba-revenue-projected-to-reach-8-billion-next-season/. 
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maintain good relations between management, labor and the customer. 
In sports, this means players and owners work together to put out the 
best product, and, in turn, hopefully most money. However, as in any 
other business, players and owners do not always get along. 
Strikes and lockouts in American professional sports are not 
uncommon.8 As recently as 2011, the NFL owners locked out players 
for 132 days amidst contentious collective bargaining agreement 
negotiations.9 A labor strike or owner lockout is the biggest threat to 
the NFL’s dominant run in American culture, and the current climate 
suggests there is potential for labor issues down the road. In August of 
2017, DeMaurice Smith, executive director of the NFL Players 
Association, said a work stoppage after the current collective 
bargaining agreement expires in 2021 is a “virtual certainty.”10 2021 is 
relatively far off in the future, and there is certainly time to mend the 
relationship between the NFL leadership and its players. This 
relationship is certainly in need of mending at the moment in light of 
the 2017 season’s Ezekiel Elliott saga, which began with a six-game 
suspension handed down by the NFL on August 11, 2017,11 and 
escalated into a full-blown legal battle in a United State District 
Court.12 The purpose of this Comment is to compare the dispute 
resolution mechanisms of European soccer and American football. 
                                                 
 8 Lockouts are a labor negotiations tactic employed by management or 
ownership of a business by which the employees are coerced into succumbing to 
management’s wishes by excluding the employees from their workplace until certain 
terms are agreed upon. See Lockout, DICTIONARY.COM, 
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/lockout (last visited Mar. 28, 2019). 
 9 Topics: NFL Lockout, ESPN (Dec. 5, 2012, 4:08 PM), 
http://www.espn.com/nfl/topics/_/page/nfl-labor-negotiations. 
 10 A.J. Perez, DeMaurice Smith: NFL Lockout or Strike in 2021 is ‘virtual 
certainty’, USA TODAY (Aug. 17, 2017, 9:29 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2017/08/17/demaurice-smith-nfl-
lockout-strike-2021-virtual-certainty/578518001/. 
 11 Todd Archer, Cowboys’ Ezekiel Elliott Suspended Six Games for Conduct, 
ESPN (Aug. 11, 2017), http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/20302469/ezekiel-
elliott-dallas-cowboys-suspended-six-games. 
 12 A.J. Perez, NFL Seeks Dismissal of Ezekiel Elliot’s Federal Court Case, USA 
TODAY (Sept. 4, 2017, 1:54 AM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/cowboys/2017/09/04/ezekiel-
elliott-suspension-lawsuit-nfl-seeks-dismissal/631939001/. 
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In Europe, athletes are also not immune to disputes with their 
management. Recently, superstar soccer player Neymar Jr. was bought 
out of his contract with the Spanish club FC Barcelona by French 
powerhouse Paris Saint-Germain (PSG) for a record-breaking $263 
million.13 The move shocked the world, and, more importantly, 
shocked FC Barcelona; so much so, in fact, that the club filed suit 
against the twenty-five year-old Brazilian for breach of contract.14 
Currently, European soccer and the NFL are structured very 
differently when it comes to handling issues between players and 
management. European soccer is governed under the leadership of 
two regulatory bodies, the Fédération Internationale de Football 
Association (FIFA)15 and the Union of European Football 
Associations (UEFA).16 The NFL, on the other hand is a completely 
independent entity; it has its own rules, and is not subject to any 
oversight apart from the thirty-two individuals who own the teams.17 
This Comment will compare the structures utilized by the NFL 
and European soccer to settle disputes between athletes and their 
management. Section I of this comment provides background 
information on European soccer, specifically Neymar’s legal situation. 
Sections I.A., I.B., and I.C., proceed to outline the current systems in 
place for European soccer disputes: the FIFA Dispute Resolution 
Chamber, the Court of Arbitration for Sport, and the FIFA 
Disciplinary Committee, respectively. Section II of this comment 
provides background information on the NFL and the issues it is 
                                                 
 13 Jonathan Wilson, Neymar’s Transfer from Barcelona to PSG Defies Belief on All 
Levels, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 3, 2017), 
https://www.si.com/soccer/2017/08/03/neymar-transfer-psg-barcelona-world-
record-fee. 
 14 Matt Bonesteel, Barcelona says Neymar Breached his Contract, Demands he Repay 
Millions in Bonus Money, WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-lead/wp/2017/08/22/barcelona-
says-neymar-breached-his-contract-demands-he-repay-millions-in-bonus-money/. 
 15 Governance, FIFA, https://www.fifa.com/governance/how-fifa-
works/index.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2019). 
 16 What UEFA Does, UEFA, https://www.uefa.com/insideuefa/about-
uefa/what-uefa-does/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2019). 
 17 Teams, NFL, https://www.nfl.com/teams (last visited Feb. 7, 2018); insert 
additional citations 
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currently facing. Section II.A. explores the procedures in place under 
the NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement that deal with grievances 
and punishment. Section II.B. describes the two latest major and most 
well-known disputes between NFL players and the NFL: 
“Deflategate” and the Ezekiel Elliott case. Finally, Section III 
challenges the proposed solution of another comment while also 
offering another, manageable solution the NFL should undertake.  
While the systems in Europe and the NFL are very different 
and both have their flaws, they have adapted to the unique needs of 
the sports they govern. Despite fears that the NFL will cease to exist 
if DeMaurice Smith’s comments come to fruition, the NFL, with some 
minor tweaking, is in great shape to continue its dominant run in 
America. This Comment will demonstrate this point, articulate why 
major reform in American sports aiming to replicate the European 
model is not needed, and demonstrate that both European soccer and 
the NFL will only continue to succeed. 
I. EUROPEAN SOCCER BACKGROUND 
The transfer window is among the most exciting times for 
soccer fans. The transfer of players within the transfer window is a 
system of player movement that is similar to free agency in American 
sports, but operates in a manner that is unique to international soccer.18 
Like the salary cap that is found in most major American sports,19 the 
transfer system was first implemented in the late nineteenth century as 
a means to prevent the wealthy clubs from using their financial clout 
to attract all the top players without compensating the former club.20 
The transfer window is the common term for what FIFA defines as a 
                                                 
 18 See Andi Thomas, The European Soccer Transfer Market, Explained (July 28, 
2014), https://www.sbnation.com/soccer/2014/7/28/5923187/transfer-window-
soccer-europe-explained. 
 19 Three of the four “major” sports leagues, which include the National 
Football League, National Basketball League, National Hockey League, and Major 
League Baseball, employ a salary cap in order to curb spending on free agents and 
allow teams in smaller markets to compete with wealthier teams. Only Major League 
Baseball does not employ a salary cap. 
 20 See generally James G. Irving, Red Card: The Battle Over European Football’s 
Transfer System, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 667 (2002). 
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registration period.21 Each year there are two transfer windows, which 
serve as the exclusive periods for which players may be registered with 
new clubs.22 The first transfer window begins sometime after one 
season ends and closes before the next season begins.23 This window 
is not to last more than twelve weeks.24 The second window occurs 
during the middle of the season and cannot “exceed four weeks.”25 
This mid-season period is mainly used for technical and tactical 
adjustments as well as to allow teams to replace injured players.26 
During the first 2017 window, which lasted from June 1 to 
September 1, 7,590 transfers across the globe occurred at a combined 
expense of $4.71 billion.27 This was a record-breaking figure that 
almost amounted to what teams spent in transfer fees in all of 2016.28 
It is this free-wheeling system that led to a dispute between Neymar Jr. 
and FC Barcelona; the controversial transfer was a consequence of the 
Spanish club’s assertion that “Neymar was not for sale.”29 However, 
Neymar’s contract contained a buy-out clause, enabling him to 
unilaterally terminate the contract for €222 million ($263,347,500), a 
                                                 
 21 See FIFA REGULATIONS ON THE STATUS AND TRANSFER OF PLAYERS, 
art. 6 § 1 (2007) [hereinafter FIFA REGULATIONS]. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. § 2. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 FIFA COMMENTARY ON THE REGULATIONS FOR THE STATUS AND 






players.ashx&usg=AOvVaw0dGntpuM0pNcN2A1BuIV4N [hereinafter FIFA 
COMMENTARY]. 
 27 Big 5 Report: New Record High in Transfer Fees this Summer, FIFA (Sept. 13, 
2017), http://www.fifa.com/governance/news/y=2017/m=9/news=big-5-report-
new-record-high-in-transfer-fees-this-summer-2907752.html. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Andy Hunter, Julien Laurens, and Sid Lowe, Neymar Set to seal World-record 
Move to PSG Worth £450 in Fees and Wages, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 2, 2017, 3:44 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/football/2017/aug/02/neymar-psg-barcelona-tells-
team-mates-leave. 
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fee which PSG paid.30 Neymar has not publicly revealed his reasons 
for wanting to leave FC Barcelona, a club FiveThirtyEight.com ranks 
near the top of its “Global Club Soccer Rankings,”31 although there 
has been speculation that Neymar wanted an “opportunity to lead the 
pack.”32 This was not possible at FC Barcelona due to the presence of 
Lionel Messi, who signed a new contract in the summer of 201733 and 
is considered one of the top two players in the world.34 
Buy-out clauses are common in many types of contracts, both 
in America and abroad, and are especially crucial to the soccer transfer 
system. As previously discussed, the transfer system was originally 
implemented to protect smaller clubs.35 Buy-out clauses add an 
additional layer of protection. Without contractual buy-outs, teams, 
especially wealthy teams, would not be able to exert the level of 
financial influence that is seen during the transfer windows and at the 
frequency with which they do. This is because, like free agency in 
American sports, after a player’s contract expires, another team can 
sign them without paying a transfer fee. The hybrid nature of the 
European system is a result of the 1995 ruling of the European Court 
of Justice in a case brought by Dutch player Jean-Marc Bosman.36 The 
European Court of Justice held that the transfer system for “out-of-
contract” players infringed upon players’ freedom of movement, and 
“was to immediately cease.”37 
                                                 
 30 Squire Patton Boggs, The Neymar Transfer: An Analysis of Buy-Out Clauses – 
Part 1, SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS (Aug. 3, 2017), 
http://www.sports.legal/2017/08/the-neymar-transfer-an-analysis-of-buy-out-
clauses-part-1/. 
 31 Jay Boice & Julia Wolfe, Global Club Soccer Rankings, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT, 
https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/global-club-soccer-rankings/ (last updated 
Mar. 30, 2019, 5:39 PM). 
 32 Tim Vickery, Neymar: What would Motivate Brazil Forward to Leave Barcelona?, 
BBC SPORT (Aug. 2, 2017), www.bbc.com/sport/football/40767713. 
 33 Id. 
 34 There is a heated debate amongst soccer fans over whether Messi or 
Portuguese and Real Madrid star, Cristiano Ronaldo deserves the title of best in the 
world. See Messi v. Ronaldo – Goals, Stats for Messi & Cristiano Ronaldo, 
MESSIVSRONALDO, messivsronaldo.net (last updated Mar. 30, 2019). 
 35 See generally, Irving, supra note 20. 
 36 See id. at 684–85. 
 37 Id. 
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In Spain, buy-out clauses are permissible under Spanish law, as 
well as under the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of 
Players.38 According to FIFA’s “Commentary on the Regulations for 
the Status and Transfer of Players” (FIFA Commentary), breaches of 
contract, which Neymar’s move would likely amount to, “give rise to 
compensation.”39 However the team and player contract for the 
amount a player must pay to unilaterally terminate the contract 
“without a valid reason.”40 The FIFA Commentary also notes that in 
certain countries, including Spain, buy-out clauses are mandatory 
pursuant to sports legislation.41 
The validity of buy-out clauses in soccer contracts was 
confirmed by the Court of Arbitration for Sport in Al Gharafa S.C & 
M. Bresciano v. Al Nasr S.C. & FIFA.42 The Al Gharafa case involved a 
situation similar to Neymar’s.43 Mark Bresciano was an Australian 
player who played for Al Nasr S.C. of the United Emirates.44 Bresciano 
unilaterally transferred to the Qatari club Al Gharafa S.C. after contract 
re-negotiations with Al Nasr failed.45 The year prior, Bresciano had 
signed a three-year contract with Al Nasr and was in contact with the 
team’s coach regarding training.46 He nonetheless terminated the 
contract, prompting action by Al Nasr.47 The matter was initially 
decided against Bresciano by FIFA’s Dispute Resolution Chamber48 
causing Bresciano to appeal to the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
(CAS).49 The CAS acknowledged the FIFA Commentary, and 
reasoned that the parties (ordinarily, the club) accept in advance that 
                                                 
 38 FIFA COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 47 n. 76. 
 39 See id. at 46. 
 40 Id. at 47. 
 41 Id. n. 76; Real Decreto 1006/1985 of 26 June (For the Regulation of the 
Employment of Professional Sportspeople). 
 42 Al Gharafa S.C & Mark Bresciano v. Al Nasr S.C. & Fédération Internationale 
de Football Association (FIFA), Arbitration CAS 2013/A/3411 at 7 [hereinafter Al 
Gharafa S.C.]. 
 43 See generally Id. 
 44 Id. at 7. 
 45 See id. 
 46 Id. at 4–5. 
 47 Id. 
 48 See infra Part I.A. 
 49 Id. at 13. 
2019 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 7:2 
538 
the contract may be terminated.50 Thus, such termination can be 
deemed to be based on the parties’ prior consent.51 The court noted, 
however, that a buy-out is not created when a term sets out the 
“consequences ‘if’ the contract is terminated, or if it refers to ‘damages’ 
caused by the player’s “‘cancellation of the contract.’”52 In Al Gharafa S.C., 
unlike in the Neymar situation, Bresciano lost and had to pay damages 
because the contract spoke of damages in the event that the contract 
was terminated.53 
The legality of the buy-out clause Neymar and PSG took 
advantage of is not the issue, however. In a statement on the club’s 
website, FC Barcelona made public their demand that Neymar return 
the prepaid consideration for his contract renewal, €8.5 million in 
damages, and “an additional 10% because of delayed payment.”54 
Barcelona also requested the PSG indemnify Neymar should he be 
unable to pay the demanded fees.55 A key element of the impending 
legal battle is the payment of a loyalty bonus to Neymar; in Neymar’s 
countersuit, he is claiming that he is owed a €26 million loyalty bonus 
stemming from his October 2016 contract.56 The contract reportedly 
entitled Neymar to a bonus after July 31, 2017, or “one year into his 
contract.”57 “[A]lthough the release clause was triggered” on August 3, 
2017, Barcelona “claim[s] that he had made the decision to leave before 
the end of July.”58 The suit will likely depend on the specific language 
                                                 
 50 Id. at 26–27. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 1. 
 53 Id. at 27–28. 
 54 FC Barcelona Statement, FC BARCELONA (Aug. 22, 2017, 2:58 PM),  
https://www.fcbarcelona.com/club/news/2017-2018/fc-barcelona-statement-22-
08-2017. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Lloyd P. Thomas & Simon Grossobel, The Neymar Transfer Saga Continues, 
SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS (Aug. 28, 2017), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a3da9c9d-65f4-44c2-8df9-
e071b69881cd (“It is noteworthy that Barcelona have brought their claim before the 
Jutjat Social, the Catalonian Labour Tribunal, although the club have passed the claim 
onto the Spanish Football Federation for referral to FIFA and the French Football 
Federation.”). 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
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of the contract and any evidence that Neymar actually decided to end 
his time with Barcelona before the date the bonus was due.59 
FC Barcelona brought their claim before the Jutjat Social, a 
Catalonian Labour Tribunal, despite the fact that the team referred the 
issue to FIFA.60 This is unlike the situation in Al Gharafa, where Al 
Nasr brought the claim before FIFA before the case was ultimately 
decided by the CAS.61 Usually, disputes arising out of transfers that 
cross international borders, like the Bresciano and Neymar transfers, 
are heard by FIFA.62 The decision to file with the Jutjat Social was a 
most likely part of the club’s litigation strategy, and the policies and 
procedures of the Jutjat Social are outside the scope of this article. The 
objective of outlining Neymar’s situation is to provide a current 
example of the types of issues the FIFA system attempts to resolve, 
rather than analyze the merits of the case. 
While the Neymar saga may not end with a ruling from the 
FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber or the CAS, the international 
attention garnered and the timing of the dispute conveniently 
juxtaposed the legal battle that took place in the United States between 
the NFL and Ezekiel Elliott.63 The NFL has deservedly received 
criticism over how it resolves disputes involving players, especially 
after the “Deflategate”64 scandal and the Elliott case. Such criticism 
has led some to suggest that the NFL should look into adopting 
                                                 
 59 Id. 
 60 See id. 
 61 See generally Al Gharafa S.C., supra note 42. 
 62 See id. 
 63 See Around the NFL staff, Cowboys RB Ezekiel Elliott Suspension Case 
Timeline, NFL (Sept. 11, 2017, 9:47 AM), 
www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000841151/article/cowboys-rb-ezekiel-elliott-
suspension-case-timeline. 
 64 The legal saga between New England Patriots quarterback Tom Brady 
and the NFL was dubbed “Deflategate” due to the claim that Brady had intentionally 
deflated footballs during a playoff game. See discussion infra Section II.B; Deflategate 
Timeline: After 544 Days, Tom Brady Gives in, ESPN (July 15, 2016), 
http://www.espn.com/blog/new-england-patriots/post/_/id/4782561/timeline-
of-events-for-deflategate-tom-brady [hereinafter Deflategate Timeline]. 
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procedures similar to those found in European soccer.65 Before 
turning to this argument, outlining how European soccer resolves 
disputes is important. 
A. FIFA Dispute Resolution 
In 2015, a lengthy investigation by the United States 
Department of Justice uncovered numerous instances of bribery 
within FIFA.66 The investigation primarily focused on the 2010 
awarding of the 2018 and 2022 World Cups to Russia and Qatar, 
respectively, and led to the resignation of FIFA President Sepp 
Blatter.67 Despite FIFA’s recent reputation, the governing body for 
international soccer’s system for dispute resolution remains credible. 
Independent of the countries whose teams are members, FIFA makes 
it its “duty to provide the most stable and sustainable foundations for 
the game.”68 FIFA was founded in 1904 under Swiss law and is 
currently located in Zurich, Switzerland.69 FIFA is run primarily 
through its Congress.70 The Congress meets once a year to pass new 
statutes and to elect FIFA’s President and various committee 
members.71 Such committees include the Disciplinary Committee and 
the Appeals Committee. The Disciplinary Committee, in accordance 
with the FIFA Disciplinary Code can impose sanctions on most parties 
                                                 
 65 See Trevor E. Brice, Labor Pains on the Playing Field: Why Taking a Page from 
Europe’s Playbook Could Help the United States, 20 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 49, 49–54 (2013) 
(advocating a “two-tiered approach to solving American professional sports’ culture 
of frequent work stoppages” involving the adoption of regulatory boards akin to 
FIFA and UEFA and legislation modeled after the Railway Labor Act). 
 66 See Austin Knoblauch & Barry Stavro, A Timeline of the FIFA Scandal, LOS 
ANGELES TIMES (June 2, 2015, 4:40 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/sports/soccer/la-sp-fifa-scandal-timeline-20150603-
story.html. 
 67 See id. 
 68 The Reform Process, FIFA, http://www.fifa.com/governance/how-fifa-
works/the-reform-process.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2017). 
 69 History of FIFA - Foundation, FIFA, https://www.fifa.com/about-
fifa/who-we-are/history/index.html (last visited April 7, 2019). 
 70 FIFA STATUTES: REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE APPLICATION OF THE 
STATUTES; STANDING ORDERS OF THE CONGRESS [hereinafter FIFA STATUTES] art. 
25 § 2. 
 71 Id.  
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involved with international soccer.72 These parties include teams, 
players, officials, and agents.73 However, the Congress and FIFA 
Council reserve the disciplinary power in the case of the suspension or 
exclusion of any member.74 The Disciplinary Committee, per the FIFA 
Statutes, may pass decisions “only when at least three members are 
present,” but “[i]n certain cases, the chairperson may rule alone.”75 
When disputes arise between players and their clubs, the dispute is 
heard by the Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC).76 The DRC 
“provides arbitration and dispute resolution on the basis of equal 
representation of players and clubs and an independent chairman.”77 
The DRC handles issues such as labor disputes, claims for training 
compensation, and overdue payables.78 
The DRC is FIFA’s main dispute resolution body.79 As such, 
its decisions are enforceable only through FIFA’s statutes,80 and are 
very important in the international soccer community. The members 
of FIFA must fully comply with DRC decisions.81 According to the 
FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (FIFA 
Regulations), the DRC adjudicates only “in the presence of at least 
three members,” which includes the DRC chairman or deputy 
                                                 
 72 Id. art. 53 § 2. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Disciplinary Committee, FIFA, http://www.fifa.com/about-
fifa/committees/committee=1882042/index.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2017). 
 75 FIFA STATUTES, supra note 70, art. 53 § 1. 
 76 Players’ Status and Transfers: Dispute Resolution Chamber, FIFA, 
http://www.fifa.com/governance/dispute-resolution-system/index.html (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2018). 
 77 Id. 
 78 Decisions of Dispute Resolution Chamber, FIFA, https://www.fifa.com/about-
fifa/official-documents/governance/dispute-resolution-chamber.html (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2019). 
 79 See Players’ Status and Transfers: Dispute Resolution Chamber, FIFA, 
http://www.fifa.com/governance/dispute-resolution-system/index.html (last 
visited April 9, 2019). 
 80 See generally, FIFA STATUTES, supra note 70, art. 53. 
 81 FIFA STATUTES, supra note 70, art. 14, § 1(a). See Ian Blackshaw, ADR 
and Sport: Settling Disputes Through the Court of Arbitration for Sport, the FIFA Dispute 
Resolution Chamber, and the WIPO Arbitration & Mediation Center, 24 MARQ. SPORTS L. 
REV. 1, 34 (2013) (outlining alternative dispute resolution in sports, including the 
FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber and Court of Arbitration for Sport). 
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chairman.82 The DRC consists of twenty-six members, equally 
representing the players and the clubs.83 Player representatives are 
nominated by FIFPro, the international players union, and the club 
representatives are nominated by the various member leagues via the 
member clubs.84 In a certain cases,85 however, a DRC judge, designated 
by the members of the DRC, may settle the case because the disputes 
are clear-cut with unquestionable facts.86 Any cases which concern 
“fundamental issues” are to be referred to the chamber.87 
Conveniently, the FIFA Commentary outlines what qualifies as a 
fundamental issue that must be submitted to the DRC panel; 
fundamental issues include situations “not covered by exiting 
jurisprudence and for which discussions within the chamber are 
essential,” situations “in which existing jurisprudence needs to be 
extended or amended,” and situations “that have a major impact on 
the daily application and interpretation of the Regulations.”88 
Procedurally, the DRC is governed by the FIFA Rules Governing the 
Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute 
Resolution Chamber (Procedural Rules).89 
Importantly, the Procedural Rules state that members of the 
DRC may not participate in the adjudication of cases in which they 
have a personal interest.90 This provision is especially important in light 
of FIFA’s recent reputation and serves to add legitimacy into DRC 
proceedings. If a member’s impartiality is called into “legitimate 
doubt” by a party, the party can challenge and submit evidence of 
                                                 
 82 FIFA REGULATIONS, supra note 21, art. 24 § 2. 
 83 FIFA, RULES GOVERNING THE PROCEDURES OF THE PLAYERS’ STATUS 
COMMITTEE AND THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION CHAMBER art. 4 (2014) [hereinafter 
PROCEDURAL RULES]. 
 84 FIFA COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 71–73. 
 85 Article 24 of the FIFA Regulations lists three scenarios in which the DRC 
judge may adjudicate: 1) “all disputes up to a litigious value of CHF 100,000” (Swiss 
Francs); 2) disputes relating to the calculation of “training compensation”; and 3) 
disputes relating to the calculation of “solidarity contributions.” FIFA 
REGULATIONS, supra note 21, art. 24, § 2.  
 86 Id. See FIFA COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 73. 
 87 FIFA COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 73. 
 88 Id. 
 89 See generally, PROCEDURAL RULES, supra note 83. 
 90 See id, art. 7 § 1. 
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impartiality within five days.91 The DRC will first determine whether it 
is the proper body to hear the case, and will then determine which of 
the FIFA statues apply.92 In a recent DRC decision, the Committee 
resolved a contract dispute regarding the unilateral termination in favor 
of the claimant player.93A reading of a DRC decision will reveal that 
the body operates very transparently, including making note of which 
of its Procedural Rules it relied on at each stage of its determination.94 
Rulings are required within thirty days if made by the DRC judge, or 
within sixty days if made by the chamber.95 
B. CAS Arbitration 
The CAS, just like FIFA, is headquartered in Switzerland.96 
The CAS is recognized by the FIFA Statutes as the body to which 
parties may appeal final decisions passed by FIFA’s legal bodies.97 
However, these appeals may only take place “after all other internal 
channels have been exhausted”98 and only in certain cases.99 Further, 
in order to ensure a consistent body of precedent, FIFA generally 
denies parties the ability to seek recourse in ordinary courts of law.100 
The CAS was originally created to handle international sports disputes 
                                                 
 91 See id. art. 7 § 2. 
 92 Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber, FIFA 4 (May 18, 2017), 
http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/02/90/72/
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 93 See generally id.  
 94 See generally id. 
 95 FIFA REGULATIONS, supra note 21, art. 25 § 1. 
 96 See Addresses and contacts, COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, www.tas-
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 97 FIFA STATUTES, supra note 70, art. 58 § 2. 
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 99 Id. art. 58 § 3 (barring appeals to the CAS in cases arising under the 
following situations: 1) “violations of the Laws of the Game”; 2) suspensions of up 
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 100 See id. art. 59 § 2. 
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in a “specialized forum,” allowing for efficient adjudication of 
disputes.101 
The CAS is governed by its Code of Sports-Related 
Arbitration, which outlines four separate procedures, including 
Ordinary Arbitration, Appeal Arbitration, the Ad hoc Division, and 
Mediation.102 The Appeal Arbitration division of the CAS is most 
relevant to European soccer, as it is the place where parties may appeal 
DRC rulings.103 Appeals from bodies like the DRC account for around 
90% of the CAS caseload, 45% of which come specifically from some 
body of FIFA.104 All appeals are heard by a panel of one or three 
arbitrators.105 The CAS has become the prominent international sports 
tribunal, and has even been credited with developing lex sportive, the 
principles of international law.106 However, as a court of arbitration, 
the CAS is not bound by preceding decisions.107 Instead, the CAS 
applies lex sportive to each case before it.108 
CAS panels, like the DRC, features either one or three 
arbitrators selected from a “geographically representative” list of 264 
CAS members.109 The number of arbitrators can be decided via an 
arbitration agreement between the parties, or, absent prior agreement, 
by the President of the Appeal Arbitration Division, “taking into 
                                                 
 101 See Louise Reilly, Symposium, An Introduction to the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport (CAS) & the Role of National Courts in International Sports Disputes, 2012 J. DISP. 
RESOL. 63, 63 (2012). 
 102 Id. at 64. 
 103 See FIFA STATUTES, supra note 70, art. 57. 
 104 Reilly, supra note 101, at 65, 69. 
 105 COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, CODE OF SPORTS-RELATED 
ARBITRATION, art. R40.1, http://www.tas-
cas.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Code_2017_FINAL__en_.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 
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 106 See Jennifer Bondulich, Rescuing the “Supreme Court” of Sports: Reforming the 
Court of Arbitration for Sport Arbitration Member Selection Procedures, 42 BROOKLYN J. 
INT’L L. 275, 279 (2016) (exploring the objectivity of the CAS and arguing that CAS 
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account the circumstances of the case.”110 The DRC members are 
appointed based on the nomination of the clubs and players.111 In 
contrast, “CAS members are required to have full legal training, 
recognized competence with regard to sports law and/or international 
arbitration, a good knowledge of sport in general and a good command 
of at least one CAS working language.”112 Like DRC panelists, CAS 
arbitrators are to “remain impartial and independent” and must 
“disclose any circumstances which may affect her/his” ability to fairly 
hear a case.113 It is also significant that the parties have the ability to 
agree on the arbitrators who will hear the case.114 Per the CAS Code of 
Sports-Related Arbitration (CAS Code), if one arbitrator is to hear the 
case, the parties have fifteen days to agree to a selection, otherwise the 
President of the Division goes through with the appointment.115 If the 
panel is to consist of three arbitrators, each party selects an arbitrator, 
and together, those two individuals select the third panelist, the 
President of the Panel.116 
Much like how the DRC applies a consistent set of “law” to its 
proceedings, regardless of where the actual dispute is heard, the CAS 
proceedings are governed by the law agreed upon by the parties.117 In 
the absence of a choice of law by the parties, Chapter 12 of the Swiss 
Act on Private International Law Act applies to the proceedings.118 
However, this is only the case if one of the parties was not domiciled, 
nor had a “habitual residence in Switzerland.”119 When it comes to the 
merits of the case, a CAS panel “has full power to review the facts and 
the law” and “may issue a new decision which replaces the decision 
challenged or annul the decision and refer the case back to the previous 
                                                 
 110 CAS CODE, supra note 105, art. R40.1. 
 111 The FIFA Statutes, FIFA Commentary, and FIFA Regulations do not 
provide clarity on the requirements of proposed members. See FIFA STATUTES, supra 
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instance.”120 The main sources of law used by CAS panels are the rules 
and regulations of the sporting body from which the challenge came.121 
This feature of the CAS is important because it requires that CAS 
arbitrators stay current with the rules and regulations of the various 
governing bodies from which appeals come. Since 1998, the FIFA 
Congress has met every year to shape international soccer through the 
FIFA Statutes, the goals being “to improve the game of football 
constantly. . . .”122 The CAS reviews any dispute either directly or 
indirectly related to sport, including those of a commercial or 
disciplinary nature, and “[a]ny individual or legal entity with capacity 
to act may have recourse to the services of the CAS.”123 Therefore, 
CAS arbitrators, have to remain knowledgeable of the issues and 
changes occurring in an array of sports, organizations, and industries. 
Additionally, it allows for consistent and predictable rulings, both key 
for any judicial body’s image. 
The CAS also recognizes the importance of sports disputes 
being resolved swiftly. As will be discussed, much of the criticism 
lobbed at the NFL recently has been related to the almost obscene 
amount of time the “Deflategate” saga took up. Contrary to time issues 
that have beleaguered the NFL’s public image, the CAS attempts to 
receive and resolve cases in a timely manner. The CAS will only accept 
a decision if the disputed ruling’s comes from a federation whose 
statutes allow for CAS arbitration and if the appellant has exhausted 
all possible remedies within its federation.124 Where no time limit is set 
by the statutes of the concerned federation, the CAS imposes an appeal 
time limit of “twenty-one-days from the receipt” of the challenged 
decision.125 The appellant has just an additional ten days to file a brief 
outlining the facts, arguments, witnesses to be called and any evidence 
                                                 
 120 CAS CODE, supra note 105, art. R57. 
 121 Reilly, supra note 101, at 68; CAS CODE, supra note 105, art. R58. 
 122 About FIFA: FIFA Congress, FIFA, http://www.fifa.com/about-
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 123 Frequently Asked Questions, COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, 
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for the CAS to consider.126 After this, the respondent has twenty days 
to file its answer which must include a statement of defense, including 
any affirmative defenses, evidence, and witnesses to be called along 
with their expected testimony.127 Failure to answer within the twenty 
day period will result in the CAS proceeding with the arbitration and 
delivering an award without considering the respondent’s defense.128 
While ordinary CAS procedures last between six and twelve months, 
an award on an appeal must be announced within three months.129 
Importantly, upon agreement of the parties, the CAS will expedite its 
process and set guidelines in accordance with the parties’ 
circumstances.130 This is especially important in an athletic context, as 
it may allow a winning athlete to compete sooner than he or she 
normally would. The CAS has even conducted proceedings via video-
conference in order to speed up of the process even more.131 
The CAS could also “grant provisional and conservatory 
measures.”132 Such measures are particularly important when an athlete 
has an upcoming competition and wants a stay of the suspension in 
order to participate.133 Those who followed the Ezekiel Elliot situation 
would recognize this mechanism, as it is similar to the requests he 
made to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New York in October 
and November of 2017 in hopes of playing while his appeal was heard 
                                                 
 126 Id. art. R51. 
 127 Id. art. R55. 
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(discussed infra).134 When deciding whether to preliminarily grant relief, 
the President of the Appellate Division or the CAS Panel (depending 
on what stage relief is sought) considers “whether the relief is necessary 
to protect the applicant from irreparable harm, the likelihood of 
success on the merits of the claim, and whether the interests of the” 
party seeking relief “outweigh” the opposing party’s interests.135 Any 
preliminary relief granted, however, will be annulled if the party 
seeking relief fails to file a “related request for arbitration within [ten] 
days” after requesting the provisional measure.136 
Like the CAS’s demands on its arbitrators to stay current with 
any relevant sports law, the ability of parties seeking relief to expedite 
the process and obtain preliminary stays contributes to the legitimacy 
of CAS proceedings and awards. CAS awards are rendered based on a 
majority decision of the three-arbitrator panel.137 Additionally, CAS 
awards state a brief reasoning for the panel’s decision.138 Should the 
losing party wish to challenge a CAS decision, they must file such 
challenge with the Swiss Federal Tribunal.139 Challenges of CAS 
decisions have increased to the point that a large portion of the Swiss 
Federal Tribunal’s case load dealing with international arbitration 
comes from the CAS.140 However, this does not mean that parties 
around the world do not respect the legitimacy of the CAS rather, the 
large number of challenged CAS awards can be attributed to the 
number of cases the CAS receives.141 Moreover, unlike other 
arbitrational bodies, CAS awards may only be appealed to the Swiss 
Federal Tribunal.142 FIFA, unlike some federations, explicitly requires 
                                                 
 134 Jared Dubin, Ezekiel Elliot asks Court for Administrative Stay that Would 
Allow Him to Play Sunday, CBS SPORTS (Nov. 2, 2017), 
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compliance with CAS awards.143 The FIFA Statutes require that 
members comply not only with FIFA regulations, but also with 
decisions of the CAS passed on the basis of an appeal from a FIFA 
body.144 Further, the Statutes require that member associations and 
confederations place a provision in their own statutes recognizing the 
jurisdiction and authority of the CAS and giving “priority to arbitration 
as a means of dispute resolution.”145 Failure to adhere to a CAS award 
subjects the violator to sanctions.146 These sanctions can include fines, 
transfer bans, and in serious cases, expulsion from FIFA.147 
FIFA’s insistence of the recognition of the CAS as a legitimate 
and final stage for all disputes has the effect of making sports-related 
disputes in Europe matter-of-fact occurrences. Players and teams (and 
attorneys) know what the standards are, how the relevant procedures 
are carried out, and who they must win over. Unlike some high-profile 
NFL legal battles, there is no debating over which Federal Court an 
appeal should be heard in, or whether a certain judge is more likely to 
rule one way or the other. Most importantly, time-consuming 
mechanisms can irritate fans. The fans largely control the economics 
of sport; they buy the tickets, merchandise and watch on television. 
The DRC and CAS’s policies and procedures work toward keeping 
fans focused on the action on the field rather than in the courtroom. 
Despite its prominence in the international sports community, 
the CAS, like the NFL, has been subjected to criticism; critics initially 
pointed to the CAS’s “close ties” to the International Olympic 
Committee, and athletes claimed that this closeness illegitimatized CAS 
                                                 
(“The award . . . shall be final and binding upon the parties subject to recourse 
available in certain circumstances pursuant to Swiss Law. . . . It may not be 
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proceedings.148 The CAS has since taken steps to improve its image, 
like founding the International Council of Arbitration for Sport to 
operate the CAS instead of the IOC.149 While some have called for 
even greater reform of the CAS,150 such measures are steps in the right 
direction. As will be discussed infra, the NFL would be smart to take 
similar measures to instill confidence in its players and fans. 
C. FIFA Disciplinary Committee 
As previously mentioned, the FIFA Statutes grant the power 
of disciplining players, clubs, associations, officials, and other FIFA 
related parties to the Disciplinary Committee, except in the case of the 
suspension or expulsion of member associations.151 The Disciplinary 
Committee is governed by the FIFA Disciplinary Code, which governs 
infringements of the rules in “every match and competition organised 
by FIFA.”152 The Disciplinary Code bans acts such as “[i]nciting hatred 
and violence,”153 brawling during a game, 154 “[p]rovoking the general 
public,”155 as well as other acts that can be classified as 
unsportsmanlike.156 Significantly, the only specific conduct by an 
individual occurring outside of a match that is mentioned in the 
seventy-four pages of rules is a ban on doping.157 In very general 
language, Article 70 of the Disciplinary Code states that “[t]he judicial 
bodies of FIFA reserve the right to sanction serious infringements of 
the statutory objectives of FIFA . . . if associations, confederations and 
other sports organisations fail to prosecute serious infringements or 
fail to prosecute in compliance with the fundamental principles of 
law.”158 While the scope of the Disciplinary Code is conduct during 
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FIFA sanctioned competition, this article appears to grant FIFA broad 
power to sanction any conduct that cuts against its “statutory 
objectives.”159 This view is strengthened when Article 70 is read in 
conjunction with what the FIFA Statutes declare to be FIFA’s 
objectives; FIFA’s objectives include the promotion of soccer 
“globally in the light of its unifying, educational, cultural and 
humanitarian values”160 and the promotion of “integrity, ethics and . . . 
all methods or practices . . . which might jeopardise the integrity of 
matches, competitions, players, officials and member 
associations. . . .”161 FIFA itself determines what is contrary to its 
objectives; however, the Disciplinary Code implicitly places the burden 
of handling issues that fall outside the field of play on the various teams 
and leagues. In fact, the word “criminal” appears just once in the 
Disciplinary Code.162 Associations are obligated to remove people who 
are “under prosecution for action unworthy of such a position 
(especially doping, corruption, forgery)” or dishonest crimes, or “who 
has been convicted of a criminal offence in the past five years.”163 
Thus, it appears as though it is incumbent on the individual 
associations and clubs within FIFA to discipline players who run into 
conflicts with the law. However, the extent of such discipline is not 
clear. 
The English Premier League is the top soccer league in 
England, boasting powerful teams like Chelsea F.C. and Manchester 
United. The Premier League is governed by the Football Association 
(FA), which governs all of English soccer.164 Among the Football 
Association’s published policies are rules on betting and integrity, 
registration of players, and financial regulation;165 policies similar to 
those put in place by FIFA. 
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The FA also promulgates a handbook for each season; the FA 
Handbook governs the conduct of all participants within the FA.166 
Section E of the Handbook states that the FA may act against any 
participant “in respect of any Misconduct.”167 Misconduct is defined 
as a breach of the “[l]aws of the [g]ame,” the rules described in the FA 
Handbook, the statute and regulations of FIFA and UEFA, the rules 
of any other affiliated association or competition, and any order or 
direction of the FA.168 The misconduct section goes on to require 
adherence to many rules similar to FIFA, including bans against 
discrimination,169 betting,170 and a mandate to maintain the integrity of 
matches and competitions.171 Unlike FIFA, however, the FA 
Handbook has a specific section regarding criminal offenses 
committed by participants.172 The FA has the power to suspend 
anyone who has been convicted of a criminal offense because the 
convicted participants continued participation constitutes a “risk of 
physical harm” to other participants.173 In addition, the FA has the 
power to suspend participants based on allegations of criminal 
offenses that may involve breaches of the Handbook’s betting and 
integrity policies.174 Such allegations include criminal gambling rings or 
accepting bribes.175 The significance of these two policies, when read 
in conjunction, is that the FA, based on its Handbook, does not have 
the power to suspend participants for alleged criminal offenses 
unrelated to the integrity of the game. Based on the FA Handbook and 
the FIFA Statutes and Regulations, the policy in international soccer 
appears to be one where the governing bodies largely allow law 
enforcement to handle criminal behavior by players, coaches, and 
others. The governing bodies only become involved when the legal 
system has run its course. As will be shown, this is very different from 
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the NFL’s current policies. Specifically, it is very different from the 
NFL’s Personal Conduct Policy. 
II. NFL BACKGROUND 
Over the course of the 2017–2018 season, the NFL 
encountered many off-the-field stories. The season began with players 
across the league kneeling during the National Anthem in protest of 
the current political climate related to police brutality.176 The protests 
garnered so much attention that President Donald Trump responded, 
calling the players “‘sons of bitches’” and the NFL “‘weak and out of 
control.’”177 The league has also endured constant criticism of its 
handling of concussions; numerous players have taken enormous hits 
and then returned to play very quickly, causing many to question the 
validity of the NFL’s concussion protocol, with some calling the policy 
“‘a fraud.’”178 A recent criticism stems from how the Carolina Panthers 
handled quarterback Cam Newton during the Wild Card Round of the 
2017-2018 Playoffs.179 Newton sustained a hit and remained on the 
ground, but only missed one play after the team determined that he 
had just been poked in the eye.180 What constitutes big news in the 
NFL is more a product of reaction than what the inherent issues are 
with the league and its structure. Twenty-four-hour coverage by the 
likes of ESPN and the NFL Network ensure that once a new story 
pops up, previous stories begin to die in the public’s mind. This is what 
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happened regarding the Ezekiel Elliott story. Once Elliott decided to 
withdraw his appeal, accepting his six-game suspension, news outlets 
turned to other sources for news. Despite this, the NFL’s structure is 
still questionable, and it begins with the Collective Bargaining 
Agreement. 
In July of 2011, the NFL owners voted 31–0, with the Oakland 
Raiders abstaining, to approve a new ten-year collective bargaining 
agreement between themselves and the players.181 Then, once the 
players also voted in favor, the 130-day lockout officially ended, and 
fans’ fear that there would be no football in 2011 was assuaged.182 One 
of the main issues was revenue sharing.183 Under the owners’ plan, 
revenue would be split only after $1 billion was portioned out for the 
owners.184 The ultimate resolution of this was a 52/48 split of the 
revenue between the owners and the players, which represented a 
lower share for the players than the previous deal.185 However, teams 
would now have to reach a floor of 89% of the salary cap, meaning 
more money in salary for veteran players.186 This rise in veteran salary, 
in addition to the new cap floor, stemmed from the institution of a 
rookie wage scale.187 
Under the 2006 collective bargaining agreement, rookies 
negotiated the terms of their contracts, oftentimes leading to the early 
picks holding out for the best contract they could get.188 Under the 
current agreement, rookie salaries are scaled according to draft slot, 
obviating the need to holdout over salary negotiations.189 In fact, since 
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the new collective bargaining agreement in 2011, the only notable 
rookie to holdout was Joey Bosa in 2016.190 Although Bosa’s salary was 
predetermined, he wanted certain offset language regarding his signing 
bonus removed, causing him to holdout for most of the team’s 
preseason training camp.191 Other “wins” for the players included a 
reduction in the number of “Organized Team Activity” sessions and a 
10% increase in minimum salaries in the first year, with continual 
increases thereafter.192 According to reports, once the owners 
approved the agreement, there was a high level of confidence that the 
players would follow suit due to the “working relationship between 
[DeMaurice] Smith and . . . Roger Goodell. . . .”193 The two had 
reportedly worked together very closely to ensure that any “remaining 
issues were resolved.”194 Times certainly have changed. Before 
discussing specific instances of the NFL’s flaws playing out in court 
and what changes should be made, a review of the NFL Collective 
Bargaining Agreement is necessary. 
A. NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement 
Governed by, construed, and interpreted under New York 
law,195 the NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement (NFL CBA) is the 
product of “bona fide, arm’s length collective bargaining” and “the 
sole and exclusive bargaining representative of present and future 
employee players in the NFL.”196 The agreement covers a bargaining 
unit that consists of all current NFL players, all veteran free agents,197 
drafted rookies, and rookie free agents.198 The NFL CBA, spanning 
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300 pages and 70 articles, covers topics including contracts,199 the 
college draft,200 collusion between teams,201 and the “Pro Bowl” all-star 
game.202 Interestingly, article 3 section 1 of the NFL CBA provides that 
neither the NFL Players Association, “nor any of its members will 
engage in any strike, work stoppage or other concerted action” that 
interferes with the operation of the NFL or any team.203 However, the 
potential 2021 lockout, like the 2011 lockout, will almost surely come 
after the NFL CBA expires. Thus article 3 section 1 would not apply. 
In terms of dispute resolution, the NFL CBA dedicates two 
articles to “grievances” and two articles to team and commissioner 
discipline.204 Article 42 describes the NFL’s policy regarding discipline 
handed down by teams.205 The NFL CBA sets maximum fines teams 
may levy on players for events like reporting to training camp 
overweight, unexcused lateness, and even throwing a football into the 
stands during a game.206 Teams are required to inform players of all 
disciplinary actions that may be taken against them at the beginning of 
training camp, and in event of a violation, provide the offending player 
written notice at any address the team reasonably expects the player to 
be located.207 Article 43 governs “non-injury grievance[s],” which is 
defined as 
[a]ny dispute . . . arising after the execution of this 
Agreement and involving the interpretation of, 
application of, or compliance with, any provision of 
this Agreement, the NFL Player Contract, the Practice 
Squad Player Contract, or any application provision of 
the NFL Constitution and Bylaws or NFL Rules 
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pertaining to the terms and conditions of employment 
of NFL players. . . .208 
Any and all grievances are to be resolved exclusively based on 
the procedure the NFL CBA sets forth.209 Grievances may be initiated 
by players, teams, the NFL Management Council, or the NFLPA and 
must be filed within fifty days of the occurrence or nonoccurrence on 
which the grievance is based, or within fifty days from the date which 
the party filing the grievance “became known or reasonably should 
have . . . known” of the “facts of the matter . . . whichever is later.”210 
Once a grievance is filed, the party to whom it is presented must 
answer within ten days setting forth admission or denials of the facts 
related to the grievance, with any denial including the specific grounds 
for denial.211 If the grievance is not resolved after filing and answer, it 
moves on to the appeal stage. Any appeal, whether by a player, a team, 
the NFLPA, or the NFL Management Council, is to be made to the 
Notice Arbitrator.212 In the event of a grievance involving a 
suspension, the suspended player will have the option to appeal 
immediately without having to file the grievance with their team or the 
league.213 In such an event, an expedited hearing is to be held by an 
arbitrator designated by the Notice Arbitrator within seven days and 
the NFL and NFLPA are to engage in “good faith efforts” to schedule 
the grievance hearing before the player’s next game.214 In addition to 
grievances involving suspensions, both the NFLPA and the NFL 
Management Council can immediately appeal up to four grievances per 
year, which allows for an expedited hearing within seven days.215 In 
such a case, the arbitrators are to issue their decision within five days 
after completion of the hearing.216 
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All relevant documents are to be submitted not later than 
fourteen days before a grievance hearing.217 Failure to do so results in 
the preclusion of submitting any documents for review by the 
arbitrators, with the caveat that the opposing party will still be able to 
review those documents.218 In the event of an expedited hearing, any 
documentary evidence must be submitted two days before the 
hearing.219 For all hearings, the arbitration panel consists of four 
arbitrators, “whose appointment must be accepted in writing by the 
NFLPA and the [NFL] Management Council,” even though only one 
arbitrator hears the grievance.220 Either of those two parties “may 
discharge a member of the arbitration panel” in writing, but only 
between July 10 and July 20 each year.221 If either party exercises this 
power, the other party has two days to discharge an arbitrator of its 
own choosing.222 Both the NFLPA and NFL Management Council 
must agree on any new arbitrators.223 If they cannot agree within thirty 
days, the Notice Arbitrator sends both sides a list of ten qualified 
arbitrators and fourteen days after that, the NFLPA and NFL 
Management Council strike names off the list back and forth until one 
name is remaining.224 The party who makes the first strike is 
determined by a coin flip, with the parties alternating who strikes first 
for the duration of the NFL CBA.225 If a party decides not to 
“cooperate in the striking process,” it waives its right to participate in 
the selection of the appointment at issue.226 
Under the NFL CBA, hearings occur according to the 
arbitrator’s schedules; each arbitrator designates a “minimum of twelve 
. . . hearing dates per year . . . for use by the parties” to the NFL 
CBA.227 After consulting with the Notice Arbitrator, each arbitrator 
will convey those dates to the NFLPA and the NFL Management 
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Council.228 This process repeats, as required, each year and for each 
new arbitrator that joins the panel.229 Once the NFLPA and NFL 
Management Council know which dates are available, each party 
notifies each arbitrator thirty days in advance of which dates are going 
to be used the following month.230 
At hearings, parties to the grievance, normally players or teams, 
and the NFLPA and NFL Management Council may present any 
relevant evidence, be it in the form of testimony, documents, or 
otherwise.231 Should a party’s witness be “unable to attend the 
hearing,” the offering party must inform the opposing party of the 
witness’s identity and unavailability.232 The parties will then, either at 
the hearing or within fourteen days thereafter, agree on dates to take 
the testimony of unavailable witnesses, which must be “within forty-
five . . . days of the parties’ receipt of the hearing transcript.”233 
Another alternative to combatting unavailable witnesses is the use of 
telephone conferencing, but only if both parties agree.234 
In cases where the “material facts” are not in dispute, the 
arbitrator has the authority to decide the case “solely on the written 
submissions of the parties.”235 Further, if the amount claimed is less 
than $25,000, the parties do not even have to meet face to face; the 
hearing can be held via telephone.236 Parties may request the 
submission of post-hearing briefs for consideration by the arbitrator.237 
In such a case, and where the grievance does not involve a suspension 
and less than $25,000 is at issue, the parties shall simultaneously submit 
post-hearing briefs.238 In the case of a suspension-related hearing or 
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one where the claim is greater than $25,000, only the arbitrator may 
request post-hearing briefs.239 
Once a hearing has been held, the arbitrator has thirty days 
from the submission of post-hearing briefs to issue a written decision, 
except that the arbitrator cannot consider briefs filed “more than sixty 
. . . days after receipt of the last transcript, unless the parties agree 
otherwise.”240 According to Article 43, the decision of the arbitrator 
constitutes the “full, final and complete disposition of the grievance, 
and will be binding upon the player(s) and Club(s) involved and the 
parties to [the NFL CBA].”241 However, as will be discussed242, in 
numerous instances players have challenged the decisions of NFL 
arbitrators, despite the agreed upon language in the NFL CBA. 
While the arbitrator has the ultimate authority in any grievance 
hearing, the NFL CBA does place some limitations on such power; the 
arbitrator may not “add to, subtract from,” or change “in any way the 
provisions” in the NFL CBA, nor any supporting document.243 The 
arbitrator also may not grant a remedy other than “a money award, an 
order of reinstatement, suspension without pay, a stay of suspension 
pending decision, a cease and desist order,” or an order of compliance 
with a specific term of the NFL CBA.244 The one alternative to the 
grievance hearing process is the Grievance Settlement Committee; at 
the end of each regular season, a “committee consisting of 
representatives of the NFLPA and representatives of the Management 
Council” meet to “engage in good faith efforts to settle or bifurcate 
any pending grievances.”245 In committee meetings, no evidence is 
taken, except the involved parties “may be contacted to obtain 
information about their dispute.”246 If the committee resolves any 
grievances by mutual agreement, the resolution, like an arbitrator 
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ruling, constitutes the “full, final and complete disposition of the 
grievance. . . .”247 
Injury grievances, claims that a player or practice squad 
member was released because of an injury sustained while performing 
the services required in their contract (i.e. injuries sustained in 
practices, games, or training with the team),248 are handled largely the 
same as non-injury grievances. The biggest distinction between the two 
types of grievances is the role of physicians; players must be examined 
by a neutral physician within twenty days of filing an injury 
grievance.249 The physician may not examine the player with the aid of 
supplemental medical information, either records submitted by the 
team or player, or communication with the team physician.250 The 
NFLPA and NFL Management Council “maintain a jointly-approved 
list of neutral physicians, including at least two orthopedic physicians 
and two neuropsychologists in each city” hosting an NFL team.251 The 
list is subject to modification only between February 1 and April 15 
each year.252 During this period, both the NFLPA and NFL 
Management Council “may eliminate any two neutral physicians from 
the list by written notice to the other party.”253 Should any vacancies 
occur, either by the doing of a party, or otherwise, both the NFLPA 
and NFL Management Council submit a list of three replacements 
within thirty days.254 If the parties are unable to agree on a choice 
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within ten days, then they perform the odd coin-flipping, striking 
procedure outlined above.255 
The NFL’s policies governing grievances are very similar to 
those of FIFA, and these policies have not brought negative attention 
to the NFL. Article 46, however, is the source of much of the NFL’s 
bad publicity.256 Article 46 outlines the process by which all disputes 
involving a fine or suspension for on-field conduct, or action taken 
against a player by the Commissioner “conduct detrimental to the 
integrity of, or public confidence in, the game of professional football” 
are handled.257 The term “conduct detrimental” is not defined in the 
NFL CBA.258 In theory the term suggests that egregious acts that 
induce public shame on the league will be covered. In practice, 
however, the term has been used as Commissioner Roger Goodell’s 
justification for imposing his own sense of morality under the guise of 
“‘protecting the [NFL] shield.’”259 In cases where Goodell decides to 
take action for “conduct detrimental” he is to send written notice of 
such action to the player and the NFLPA.260 The player, or the 
NFLPA, then has three business days to appeal in writing to 
Goodell.261 For on-field offenses, any fines or suspensions are levied 
by “a person appointed by the Commissioner.”262 The appointment of 
said person occurs after consultation with the Executive Director of 
the NFLPA.263 Like in “conduct detrimental” cases players have three 
business days to appeal in writing to the Commissioner.264 In the case 
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of a “conduct detrimental” appeal, the Commissioner appoints one or 
more designees to serve as hearing officers.265 
In contrast, for on-field punishment appeals, the 
Commissioner and the Executive Director of the NFLPA, on a yearly 
basis, “jointly select two . . . or more designees to serve as hearing 
officers.”266 Article 46 also provides for appeals in cases arising from 
“conduct detrimental.”267 In such cases, “the Commissioner may serve 
as hearing officer in any appeal under Section 1(a) of this Article at his 
discretion.”268 This difference in the appeals process is essential to the 
criticism endured by Roger Goodell. Thus, what Article 46 boils down 
to is Goodell’s ability to serve as judge, jury, executioner, and court of 
appeals in cases involving “conduct detrimental” to the NFL. This 
enormous power vested in Goodell can also be illustrated simply by 
comparing the length of Article 46 with that of Articles 43 and 44: 
Article 46 spans less than three pages in the CBA, while Articles 43 
and 44 combine for over twelve pages. While the rules governing 
normal disputes appear to be heavily bargained for, when it comes to 
Commissioner discipline, Roger Goodell seems to have applied the 
league’s massive leverage (discussed infra) directly against the players’ 
throats. 
B. Tom Brady and Ezekiel Elliott 
No two stories have generated more coverage and scrutiny of 
Roger Goodell’s powers than Tom Brady and “Deflategate” and the 
recent Ezekiel Elliott saga. “Deflategate” can be described as nothing 
short of a debacle, spanning 544 days and ultimately ending with 
Goodell coming out on top, as he always does.269 The saga began after 
Indianapolis Colts linebacker D’Qwell Jackson intercepted one of 
Brady’s passes in the 2015 AFC Championship Game and handed “the 
ball to a member of the Colts’ equipment staff, who noticed the ball 
seemed underinflated and notified coach Chuck Pagano.”270 After the 
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game, which the Patriots won handedly 45-7, ESPN’s Chris Mortensen 
reported that eleven of the twelve “balls used in the first half of the 
game were significantly underinflated.”271 Three days later, the NFL 
announced that it was launching an investigation into the deflated 
footballs led by Jeff Pash and Ted Wells.272 The Patriots then went on 
to defeat the Seattle Seahawks in Super Bowl XLIX 28-24.273 On May 
6, 2015, after almost five months and millions of dollars, the “Wells 
Report” is released, in which the NFL stated that it was “‘more 
probable than not’ that Patriots personnel deliberately deflated 
footballs . . . and that Brady was probably ‘at least generally aware’ of 
the rules violations.”274 Tom Brady was suspended for four games and 
the Patriots were fined $1 million and forfeited two draft picks.275 
When the NFLPA announced Brady was to appeal the 
suspension, it urged Goodell to appoint a neutral arbitrator; however, 
the NFL announced that Goodell would, in fact, preside over the 
appeal.276 In a letter to the NFLPA Goodell officially informed the 
union that he would be presiding over the appeal, citing his 
responsibility under the NFL CBA to “‘serve as hearing officer in any 
appeal involving conduct detrimental to the integrity of the game.’”277 
On June 23, 2015, Goodell heard Brady’s appeal, and five days later, 
the NFL announced that the suspension would not be reduced.278 
Brady then filed a cause of action in the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York challenging Goodell’s decision.279 On 
September 3, 2015, Judge Richard Berman vacated the four-game 
suspension.280 In so doing, Judge Berman criticized Roger Goodell for 
“‘dispens[ing] his own brand of industrial justice.’”281 In response to 
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the ruling, the NFL appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit in New York.282 The appeal was heard on March 3, 
2016, over a year after the Patriots’ win over the Colts.283 On April 25, 
2016, the Second Circuit reversed the lower court’s ruling, reinstating 
the suspension.284 The court reasoned that Goodell properly exercised 
his broad discretion as arbitrator, discretion that was properly 
grounded in the NFL CBA and that did not deprive Brady of 
“fundamental []fairness.”285 
Specifically, the court noted that “the parties contracted in the CBA to 
specifically allow the Commissioner to sit as the arbitrator in all 
disputes brought pursuant to Article 46, Section 1(a)” and that “[t]hey 
did so knowing full well that the Commissioner had the sole power of 
determining what constitutes ‘conduct detrimental,’. . . .”286 After this 
ruling, Brady filed a motion for a second hearing, which was denied.287 
Brady ended up serving his four-game suspension at the beginning of 
the 2016 season, which ended with the Patriots defeating the Atlanta 
Falcons in Super Bowl LI.288 
The Ezekiel Elliott saga, while not as prolonged as 
“Deflategate,” followed a very similar path. On August 11, 2017, after 
a year-long investigation, the NFL announced that it was suspending 
Elliott for six games after finding that Elliott assaulted his former 
girlfriend, Tiffany Thompson.289 Elliott was originally accused by 
Thompson in July of 2016, but after months of investigation, 
prosecutors announced in September 2016 that Elliott “would not be 
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charged with domestic violence.”290 Like Brady, Elliott appealed the 
suspension.291 Unlike Brady, however, the appeal was heard by Harold 
Henderson, who was appointed by Goodell, pursuant to NFL CBA 
Article 46 § 2.292 On September 1, 2017, before the final ruling on the 
suspension, the NFLPA, on behalf of Elliott, filed for a “temporary 
restraining order in Texas to block any suspension upheld by 
Henderson.”293 Henderson upheld the suspension on September 5, 
2017, less than a week before the start of the 2017 regular season.294 
However, because of the timing of the appeal decision, Elliott was 
allowed to play in Week 1.295 Elliot then filed for a preliminary 
injunction against the NFL’s enforcement of the suspension in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Sherman 
Division, which was granted by Judge Amos Mazzant on September 8, 
2017.296 
In his opinion, Judge Mazzant stated that the NFL and Harold 
Henderson breached the NFL CBA when Henderson denied Elliott 
“access to certain procedural requirements,” including access to 
“investigators notes,” the opportunity to cross examine Tiffany 
Thompson, and the chance to question Roger Goodell.297 Based on 
the procedural denials, Judge Mazzant found that Elliott did not 
receive a fundamentally fair hearing before Henderson.298 Like in 
Brady’s case, the NFL appealed Judge Mazzant’s ruling in the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.299 Just like the Second 
Circuit’s ruling in the Brady case, the Fifth Circuit vacated the lower 
court’s ruling.300 The court reasoned that Elliott’s lawsuit was 
premature, because Elliott had not exhausted all his “grievance 
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procedures” in the NFL CBA.301 Thus, the District Court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction over the case.302 Further, Elliott’s failure to 
exhaust all remedies was not excused because the NFL abided by all 
the arbitration provisions in the NFL CBA.303 
After the NFL sought affirmation of Henderson’s award in the 
Southern District of New York, Elliott filed another motion for a 
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction barring the 
NFL’s enforcement of his six-game suspension.304 The temporary 
restraining order was granted on October 17, 2017, which allowed 
Elliott to play until the legal process wound up.305 A hearing for the 
preliminary injunction was scheduled for October 30, 2017.306 Elliott’s 
primary argument at the preliminary injunction hearing was that he was 
denied “‘fundamental fairness’” during his arbitration proceedings.307 
However, the court found that Elliott failed to establish that 
Henderson’s decision was fundamentally unfair.308 The court reasoned 
that Henderson complied with all provisions of the NFL CBA, which 
did not require him to allow Elliott to confront Thompson or 
Goodell.309 Like in Brady’s case, the court relied heavily on the fact that 
the players collectively bargained for the provisions in the CBA.310 As 
long as the NFL complied with such provisions, which the court found 
it did, Elliott’s fundamental fairness argument could not prevail.311 On 
November 15, 2017, Elliott dropped his appeal, and began serving his 
suspension.312 
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III. WHAT THE NFL SHOULD DO 
The Brady and Elliott cases are the most publicized and 
extreme examples of NFL players fighting back against Roger 
Goodell’s enormous power. While to an outsider, Brady and Elliott 
may have had strong cases stemming from a fundamentally unfair 
process, the NFL will continue to point to the NFL CBA as its trump 
card. As long as the NFL CBA retains Article 46 as it currently is 
written, courts will continue to find in favor of the NFL. If the NFL 
and Roger Goodell are going to begin to revive their public image, they 
should start with Article 46 during the approaching NFL CBA 
negotiations; a step that does not require the drastic changes some have 
called for. 
A. Argument Against Trevor Brice’s Solution 
Trevor Brice begins his 2013 article, entitled “Labor Pains on 
the Playing Field: Why Taking a Page from Europe’s Playbook Could 
Help the United States,” with an overview of the history of work 
stoppages in American pro sports, as well as the current applicable 
law.313 Currently, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) creates the 
collective bargaining rights of private American workers, including 
professional athletes.314 The NLRA’s purpose is to encourage 
collective bargaining in order to remove “‘substantial obstructions to 
the free flow of commerce.’”315 Brice notes that “[t]he theme behind 
the NLRA is that private parties engaged in business should resolve 
disputes arising out of that business without government 
interference.”316 Thus, according to Brice, no one form of dispute 
resolution is favored over another, making work stoppages an option 
just as good as mediation or arbitration.317 As a result, Brice argues that 
because of the incentivization of the use of “economic weapons” in 
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sports labor negotiations, the NLRA is an “ineffective means of 
regulating [such] negotiations.”318 
Brice goes on to outline the governing bodies of sport in 
Europe, including FIFA and UEFA.319 Brice believes that “strong 
governing organization[s] with the power to intervene in disputes,” like 
FIFA, help to minimize the use of work stoppages and lockouts.320 
Because of this, Brice proposes that the United States should create a 
governmental body charged with overseeing all aspects of professional 
sports.321 Brice’s key reasoning is that such a body would help take 
labor disputes “out of the hands of self-interested parties and put them 
into the hands of” an entity whose purpose is preserving sports.322 
Brice argues that the “new body should enforce its own statutes 
through its own dispute-resolution system,” like the structure in place 
with FIFA.323 
As part of this, Brice proposes that the U.S. implement new 
legislation in the mold of the Railway Labor Act (RLA).324 Enacted in 
1926, the RLA’s purpose is the avoidance of “interruption of interstate 
commerce by providing for the prompt resolution of labor disputes 
while still protecting the right of employees to bargain collectively.”325 
To accomplish this goal, the statute imposes a duty on the parties “to 
undertake all reasonable efforts toward negotiating a settlement before 
allowing for the use of economic weapons.”326 The RLA has several 
provisions which encourage mediation over work stoppages and 
lockouts.327 Under the RLA, collective bargaining agreements don’t 
expire, but rather have dates at which they become amendable.328 
Additionally, strikes and lockouts cannot be employed for “‘minor’” 
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disputes.329 Brice believes that similar legislation, applied to sports, 
would require the parties to make more of a genuine effort before 
resorting to work stoppages or lockouts.330 
Brice’s argument hinges on the assumption that both athletes 
and leagues have “tremendous leverage” that is uncommon in most 
other labor dispute contexts.331 However, this is simply not the case in 
the NFL. In July of 2017, Seattle Seahawks cornerback Richard 
Sherman, a member of the NFLPA Executive Committee, said, “‘[i]f 
we want to get anything done, players have to be willing to strike.’”332 
Sherman noted that in order to seek change, players are “‘going to have 
to miss games, [they’re] going to have to lose some money’” if they are 
to make a point.333 This is easy for Sherman to say because he is one 
of the league’s marquee players, with an average salary of around $9 
million.334 Because of his status, he has a certain degree of leverage, but 
that makes him an exception in the NFL. The vast majority of NFL 
players have very little leverage compared to the billionaire owners that 
employ them. This is evidenced mainly by the fact the average NFL 
career is very short, and it is getting shorter.335 
According to a Wall Street Journal analysis of data from 2008 to 
2014, the average NFL career is 2.66 years, down from 4.99 years in 
2008.336 Most players do not have the bank account Sherman does, and 
need to cash in on what is likely to be a very short career. While 
Sherman is correct in saying the players have to strike, they simply do 
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not have the leverage to do so on a league-wide scale. Even if the top 
players, who can afford to strike, do so, the lesser known players will 
see that as an opportunity to play more and the league will go on. The 
situation has presented itself in the past, most notably with the 
Washington Redskins; in 1987, the NFLPA went on strike, leaving 
teams like the Redskins to play with replacement players.337 The league 
played its schedule with the “scabs” until the regular players broke their 
strike.338 The striking players felt pressure to cross the picket line 
because the teams appeared un-phased by the use of the replacement 
players.339 The Washington “Scabskins”340 are a great example of the 
disparity in leverage between the owners and the players. Because of 
this disparity, the drastic measures Brice proposes are unnecessary. 
Not only would Brice’s proposal require lots of time working its way 
through Congress, but because NFL players are unlikely to effectively 
strike, new legislation could only potentially disrupt a very successful 
industry. There is a simpler solution. 
B. Manageable Changes 
The NFL CBA’s provisions regarding injury and non-injury 
grievances341 are similar to those found in FIFA. They attempt to 
provide transparency and clear guidance to the grievance process, with 
input from both the NFLPA and the NFL Management Council. 
Thus, the roadmap is already in place for the NFL to improve its 
relations with players. The media and player criticism of the NFL and 
Roger Goodell has stemmed from instances like the Brady and Elliott 
suspensions. Both suspensions were handed down pursuant to Article 
46, not Article 43.342 The issue is very clearly the enormous grant of 
power bestowed upon Roger Goodell by Article 46 and his role as 
judge, jury and executioner. As such, rearticulating Article 46 to mirror 
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the procedures for injury and non-injury grievances would go a long 
way in improving the relationship between Goodell and the players. 
One place the NFL could look to for guidance is the NBA 
Collective Bargaining Agreement (NBA CBA); since entering the role 
in 2014, NBA Commissioner Adam Silver has widely been viewed as 
a very player-friendly commissioner.343 Part of the reputation has come 
from how Silver has dealt with players’ social activism,344 and a large 
part has come from the recent influx of money due to a new television 
deal.345 The new deal with ESPN and TNT began at the beginning of 
the 2016–2017 season and is worth $24 billion over nine years.346 The 
deal is almost three times more than the previous deal.347 When the 
deal was completed in 2014, many projected that it would increase the 
salary cap from $63 million to above $100 million by the 2017–2018 
season.348 The projections fell just short, with the NBA announcing in 
the summer of 2017 that the 2017–2018 cap would be set at $99.093 
million.349 While not all players are paid equally, this averages out to 
$8,257,750 for each of the twelve players on an active NBA roster. For 
comparison, the NFL’s salary cap for the 2017–2018 season was 
$177.2 million.350 This averages out to $3,343,396.23 for each of the 
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fifty-three players on an active NFL roster. NBA players are very well 
paid, and, in turn, they are very happy. 
Commissioner Silver does not differ from Goodell just on 
good will, however. The NBA CBA’s policies regarding commissioner 
discipline are more player friendly than those found in the NFL. Article 
XXXI, section 9 (a) of the NBA CBA states that disputes involving 
action taken by the commissioner “concerning the preservation of the 
integrity of, or the maintenance of public confidence in, the game of 
basketball” and that results in a financial impact of less than or equal 
to $50,000, are not handled as grievances and are not resolved by the 
Grievance Arbitrator.351 Like the NFL, players disciplined under this 
commissioner power may appeal in writing to Silver.352 Also like the 
NFL, Silver hears the appeal and issues a written decision that, absent 
subsequent appeal, constitutes the “full, final and complete 
disposition” of the case.353 However, this is only for minor cases. 
Unlike the NFL, the NBA alters its commissioner discipline 
procedures for more serious offenses; in the event of a suspension 
under Silver’s aforementioned powers that results in a financial impact 
of more than $50,000, the process is handled “in the same manner as 
a Grievance.”354 The only difference in such a proceeding is that the 
Grievance Arbitrator must apply an “‘arbitrary and capricious’ 
standard of review.”355 The Grievance Arbitrator has “exclusive 
jurisdiction” to determine all disputes which come before him/her.356 
The NBA procedures for handling grievances, in terms of initiating the 
grievance and the timing provisions, are similar to those of the NFL.357 
The Grievance Arbitrator is agreed upon by the NBA and the NBA 
Players’ Association (NBAPA), and either party “may discharge the 
Grievance Arbitrator by serving written notice upon him/her” and the 
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other party during the period between July 27 and August 1 each 
year.358 
The distinction made by the NBA CBA between serious and 
minor offenses, and their correlating procedures serves as a check on 
Commissioner Silver’s power to deal out punishment under his 
reiteration of “conduct detrimental.” The NFL would be smart to 
adopt a similar model. The NBA’s policy allows for the commissioner 
to have a certain degree of latitude in wielding the power he rightly has, 
but also allows for independent review in serious cases where the 
player is even more likely to challenge the punishment. A twelve-game 
suspension in the NBA (~14% of regular season games) is roughly 
equivalent to a two-game suspension in the NFL (12.5% of regular 
season games). Were the NFL to adopt this distinction in procedure, 
suspensions like those challenged in “Deflategate” and Elliott’s case 
would be reviewed by an independent party, possibly eliminating the 
need to take the case to Federal court. The NBA’s model is just one 
route the NFL could take in the approaching CBA negotiations, 
however. Whatever the NFL does, it must consider how the policies 
will be viewed by a group of players who already do not trust Goodell. 
This one minor tweak could go a long way towards rebuilding that 
trust. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
While the NFL remains the top sports league in the United 
States, it is no secret that the NFL is in a different place than it used to 
be. While the league saw its television ratings increase this past season 
by 5%,359 the NFL saw ratings drop 9.7% during the 2017-2018 season, 
a further decline from the 8% decrease during the 2016-2017 season.360 
The 2016 season’s drop was been attributed to the unusual Presidential 
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race,361 while the more recent decline, according to one survey, was 
mainly due to players kneeling during the National Anthem.362 The rise 
in ratings during the 2018 season has been attributed to higher 
offensive outputs that created exciting, close games.363 It is also likely 
that fans tuned in more frequently because there was no overbearing 
controversy like the Tom Brady and Ezekiel Elliott situations. The 
NFL appears as though it is recovering from the slide it endured from 
2016-2018; however, the league’s image could still use some refreshing, 
and the first step is rebuilding trust with the players. While the NFL 
has survived lockouts before, there is a possibility that some Americans 
could find other ways to entertain themselves, or become fed up with 
the league, a lockout could not come at a worse time. The NFL’s worst 
public relations nightmare would be DeMaurice Smith and the NFLPA 
allowing the league to slip into another lockout in 2021. The NFL, and 
Roger Goodell, must think hard about whether power is more 
important than a good relationship with the players, not only for their 
sake, but also for the millions of fans who live and die with their teams. 
Daniel Kraker and David Morris best summed up the place 
professional sports teams have in their communities: 
This combination of emotion, history and 
entertainment make sports a business unlike any other. 
The people of Detroit don’t congregate around the 
television to watch Ford or GM workers build cars; 
Seattle residents don’t watch Microsoft employees 
design software. But rooting for the Tigers and the 
Supersonics and the Lions is a natural communal 
activity.364 
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A fall without NFL football would crush so many people, and 
so many communities that depend on their team, in both economic 
and noneconomic ways. Despite the comments Smith has made, 
because of the disparity in leverage between the owners and the 
players, a lengthy lockout is unlikely. But this does not mean that 
Goodell cannot take a page out of Adam Silver’s book and relinquish 
some power in order to build better relationships with the players, and, 
as a result, a better relationship with the fans. After all, without fan 
support the NFL would cease to exist. 
